An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1748

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Summary

Background

Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapters 1-3

Chapters 4-6

Chapters 7-9

Chapters 10-12

Key Figures

Themes

Index of Terms

Important Quotes

Essay Topics

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Discussion Questions

Chapters 7-9Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapter 7 Summary: “Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion”

Hume praises how ideas are always clear in mathematics. The problem with the science of morals, or moral philosophy, is “the obscurity of ideas and ambiguity of the terms” (44). Any idea of the mind is a copy of an impression that was experienced in the past, and this necessarily informs how our ideas are formed and connected. When one first encounters an object in the outside world, one can’t know the possible effect it will have; with experience, however, one can begin to infer the impact that tends to follow the prior action.

Philosophers discover that “even in the most familiar events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual” (51). Some philosophers are astute enough to recognize that power doesn’t lie in the human will. However, they naively assert God directly enacts this power: “Thus, according to these philosophers, every thing is full of God” (52), and in this manner, the laws of nature are overthrown. In truth, all that is revealed is their own ignorance.

In the second part of the chapter, Hume draws out the concept of moving from perceived conjunction to real connection. The only difference between the two is the frequency of our observations. A single instance alone can only give us a faint idea of conjunction. When many instances of the same events occur in a patterned succession, the mind connects the two, drawing a connection of what is called cause and effect. Cause is defined as “an object followed by another” (56). As Hume writes, “if the first object had not been, the second never had existed” (56).

Chapter 8 Summary: “Of Liberty and Necessity”

In the history of discussions about liberty and necessity, there has been an absence of commonly agreed-upon terminology. However, humanity has always agreed upon the realities of liberty and necessity, even if they have differed on how to speak about them.

When it comes to necessity, “causation arises entirely from the uniformity, observable in the operations of nature” (60). Even among human beings, “the same motives always produce the same actions” (60). Hume argues that human beings have always been the same, everywhere and at all times. Foreign nations do not have customs and habits that wholly contradict our experience of the human race. Human nature is known to us by experience and observation.

This does not mean that there is no variety in human temperament. On the whole, however, human beings are largely similar in thought, word, and deed. To this end, therefore, the “conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform” (64) as anything else in nature. Human action is predictable.

In the second part of the chapter, Hume explores the relation between a person and their actions. A human action is not directly linked to a human person. Therefore, we must see only activity as morally noteworthy, not the person—“a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth” (71). It is the action alone which is worthy of merit or condemnation. We can trace our activity back to God, and we must either attribute all activity to him—and thus our wicked actions—or we can’t trace the moral worth of activity to anyone.

Chapter 9 Summary: “Of the Reason of Animals”

We can infer certain effects from certain causes, owing to our experience and the track record of our sense impressions. The same seems to be true of animals, who also learn from experience. Animals do not gain experiential knowledge rationally since animals do not reason. Likewise, small children experience the consequences of their actions and make inferences before they learn to reason. Hume argues that nature “has provided some other principle” by which matters of fact can be known and used to plan out future action (77). Usually, we call this instinct.

Chapters 7-9 Analysis

If philosophy were as clear as math, Hume wouldn’t have felt the need to tackle moral reasoning. He argues that all ideas are planted in the mind by what is experienced by the senses. In this way, he is following the classical tradition, as both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas argued the same thing. However, Hume is unique in his belief that there is no necessary link or connection between effect and cause.

It is universally acknowledged that one can’t infer anything about an object one first encounters and has no knowledge of. Hume is unique in proposing that no cause or effect can ever be truly known and that no discernable earthly power creates a causal relationship between two things. Cause and effect, then, is an invention of the human mind.

Hume points out that some have posited the intervention of divine activity to explain effects, that God is the one who creates this cause-and-effect relationship.

He questions why God would create a world in which humans perceive that cause and effect are linked without recognizing how. If God is responsible, then we must do away with belief in evil activity. Otherwise, we would logically have to attribute every wicked act and crime to God. When we recognize that one event always follows another, we are able to imagine the link and know what to expect. However, we can’t ever conclude that one thing necessarily follows from another—only that we can have certain expectations.

Hume argues that people everywhere are consistent enough that we can form expectations of how they act and speak. Although humans are not robotic carbon copies, their natures and actions are similar enough to be predictable. If we were to hear of a person or group acting wholly contrary to our experience of normal human activity, it would be impossible to believe.

Hume does not mean for his deconstruction of the cause-and-effect relationship to result in chaos or the breakdown of the scientific method; he simply means to change the way that the relationship is viewed. Human experience is essential for knowledge and the ability to plan for the future. In addition, as Hume acknowledges, “scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others” (64). Ideas of cause and effect would never have occurred to us if there was not a regular, reliable association between certain objects and activities.

This influences how we judge the morality of actions. People judge sporadic acts of passion differently from planned behavior. The act of passion is not linked as intimately to the actor and is judged less harshly. Hume pushes this line of thinking: If we are to attribute any activity to God, then one has to be careful since God is typically said to be the cause of all things in existence. The question then becomes whether or not to attribute wicked activity to God.

Hume argues that since animals can infer the association between objects, inference is not rooted in rational activity. In animals, inference is called instinct; in human beings, this recognition is not often called instinct, but greater experience results in greater ability to recognize the patterns that we call cause and effect.