Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead

The violence has subsided in Iraq, although there is still a significant American presence, and American troops are involved at all levels of training and building the Iraqi military. Mattis does not trust the recently installed Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki. He believes Maliki will work to disenfranchise the Sunni minority and destabilize the country. He says as much to Vice President Joe Biden in Baghdad in the summer 2010. Mattis considers Biden to be likable but also feels he has tunnel vision because of his desire to remove all US troops from Iraq as soon as possible. In Mattis’s eyes, such a move risks losing the fragile peace and everything he and his troops have fought and died for.

The Obama administration offers a token troop presence to remain in Iraq if the Iraqi government gives the soldiers legal immunity. Mattis believes this approach to be clever manipulation on the part of White House, since there is little likelihood the Iraqi Parliament would ever agree to such a thing. The troops are brought home, and Obama claims victory as Iraq is now “sovereign, stable, and self-reliant” (209). In Mattis’s eyes the rhetoric does not match the reality on the ground.

Turning to Afghanistan, Mattis finds General Petraeus’s troops feeling hamstrung by excessively complicated rules of engagement. Petraeus informs Mattis that he is going to simplify the rules and that the press might portray this move unfavorably. Mattis approves his decision, knowing that soldiers in the field do not have the luxury of asking permission in every scenario.

President Obama sends 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan in 2010, but Mattis is disappointed when Obama states publicly that those extra troops will come home in 18 months. Once again Mattis feels the tension between the imperative to win the war and the knowledge that the plan is to exit before the war can be won.

One bright spot underlies for Mattis the importance of allies. The Jordanians had sent a battalion under Colonel Aref al-Zaben. Zaben was able to use his own Muslim clerics to counter Taliban propaganda, as well as to take Afghan village elders to Jordan to see mosques and churches coexisting peaceably to show it could be done. The Jordanians are able to reach some Afghans in ways that the Americans are unable to do.

Mattis spots a vulnerability in Afghanistan. All the supply lines run through Pakistan, an unreliable ally at best. Mattis works to create a new supply line from the North while stocking 90 days’ worth of supplies in Afghanistan. This goal is accomplished, and shortly thereafter Pakistan is angered by a border incident and closes its borders to American supply flow. Mattis’s foresight saves the American soldiers from being cut off.

Eventually the surge ends, and the bulk of the troops head home. Mattis’s confidant, Colonel John Toolan, opines to Mattis that the problems in Afghanistan are deep and cultural and that bribes and corruption are considered normative, not following the law or cooperation with each other.

Mattis reflects on the lesson of South Korea, another country that had no history of democracy or Western ideals. American troops occupied South Korea for 40 years before a healthy democracy began to take hold. Mattis laments that the United States is no longer playing the long game in conflicts in the Middle East.

Mattis’s responsibilities cover far more than Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010 what came to be known as the Arab Spring begins to take shape. It consisted of a series of mass protests and revolts all throughout the Muslim world, largely in Mattis’s area of responsibility. Both Mattis and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates view these uprisings with some ambivalence. A revolution against terrible governance does not necessarily entail something better or more democratic will take its place. As a case in point, Mattis sees a long-time American ally in Egypt, President Mubarak, overthrown by the Arab Spring movement. What takes his place is the Muslim Brotherhood, a far more repressive regime than what came before it. Fortunately, the Egyptian public reacts negatively to this development, and within a year the Brotherhood is replaced by the Egyptian military.

Mattis travels constantly during this timeframe, assuring long-time allies that America will stand by them and using diplomacy to attempt to steer the Arab Spring in fruitful directions. Mattis experiences constant criticism from allies and enemies alike, but he is philosophical about it, saying, “I think Americans are subject to more lectures about our shortcomings than any other people, because more is expected of us” (224).

Mattis reveals some of his diplomatic strategies here. He advocates for speaking well of allies in public and, if necessary, chastising them in private so as to protect their dignity. He is critical of the administration for sometimes expecting too much in terms of human rights reform with regard to American allies in the region. He believes that America should always advocate for the rights of others and act as an example but that American expectations should be tempered by a realism, as many of these countries have no history of democracy, personal liberties, or even independence in a post-colonial world. In Mattis’s eyes, whatever shortcomings these countries have, they are still preferable to regimes such as Iran and Syria that actively spread terrorism and instability.

Mattis takes Obama to task for not responding militarily when Assad uses chemical weapons on his own people, even though Obama indicated this would not be tolerated. Mattis says this “was a shot not heard around the world” (228), and that for American allies this decision created uncertainty as to the resolve of the American people.

In 2011 Mattis discovers that Iranian agents attempted a bombing in Washington, DC. He is surprised again that the administration takes no punitive action against Iran. Iran then captures a British ship and attempts to shoot down an American drone in international waters, with no reply from America. Mattis believes all these incidents reflect a lack of will and strategic thinking on the part of the Obama administration and that ultimately America’s reliability as an ally or strength as an enemy will come into question.

Mattis steps back from the narrative in this last chapter to look at the larger picture of the United States, the Marines, and leadership in general. His first reflection here is on the need for a strong military in general. Mattis’s theory is that weakness invites conflict and that democracy has many enemies still in the world. He makes a warning about the military not being an appropriate “petri dish for social experiments” but does not elaborate on what he has in mind here (236).

Mattis restates again the importance of combining strong leadership with encouraging subordinates to take initiative, as long as it is in keeping with the overall vision of the commander. He believes strongly in mentoring if it does not devolve into a kind of tyranny. He also reemphasizes the importance of reading and learning from history.

Trust is of the essence at every level in Mattis’s vision of an ideal military. This means in-person visits, genuine relationships, and open lines of communication. Trust must travel up the chain of command as well as down. He sees the failure to capture bin Laden in Tora Bora as an example of superior officers not adequately trusting the information received from lower ranking soldiers who were closer to the action.

Clarity and a willingness to compromise are necessary aspects of a command structure, particularly when (as was usually the case in the wars Mattis was involved in) other countries are present as allies on the battlefield. Mattis sees the presence of allies as a barometer for the health of the nation: “Nations with allies thrive, and those without wither” (244).

The chapter ends with Mattis being tapped to be secretary of defense under Donald Trump (although he does not name Trump). Mattis explains that he served as such for 712 days but then resigned, largely because his advice and guidance were not being heeded.

Mattis provides a brief addendum here that is a rebuke of tribalism in the United States. He fears a growing “mutual disdain” in the country’s politics and culture. However, he expresses optimism for the future, saying that the current divide can be overcome, and ending with the Latin phrase found on the US coinage: E pluribus unum, or “out of many, one” (249).