Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Explain Everything About the World

Latin America’s geography—from Mexico to the southern tip of South America—limits the region’s economic success. Latin America’s “total population [...] is 600 million people, yet their combined GDP is equivalent to that of France and the UK, which together comprise 120 million people” (232).

Wealthy European colonists established cities near the coast, with roads inland to collect resources, but because the interior of the region, especially the disease-infested jungles, is of little interest to the Europeans, they did not invest in building roads that cross from coast to coast.

Mexico is limited by harsh northern deserts, dense southern jungles, and mountains in between; its coasts on the Pacific and Gulf of Mexico have few deep harbors. Brazil’s “internal regions will remain isolated from one another” (231). Argentina and Chile, “despite their wealth of natural resources, will still be farther away from New York and Washington than are Paris and London” (231). Moreover, South America’s Andes mountain range runs 4,500 miles, cutting off western coastal areas from the rest of the continent. East of the Andes, in the temperate southern region, the land is fairly flat and good for agriculture and construction, but the northern areas are dominated by mountains and jungles.

One overall advantage is that nearly all Latin American countries speak Spanish or Portuguese. A drawback is that the borders between countries descend from arbitrary decisions made centuries ago in Europe. Add the mix of African and European immigrants living among native peoples, and a culture clash results. On top of that, “a fluctuating set of anticolonialist/pro-socialist ideas that often stray into nationalism” (234) generates instability.

Bolivia in 1879 lost a war with Chile and gave up its Pacific coastline, making it landlocked: “This in turn has exacerbated the severe divide between the mostly European lowlands population and the mostly indigenous peoples of the highlands” (234). Several countries lay claim to portions of their neighbors, and wars have erupted over these disputes, the latest in 1995 between Ecuador and Peru.

The land that makes up California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas belonged to Mexico until 1848, when the US took over the land in the Spanish-American War. Mexico’s modern-day northern border lies on difficult desert terrain; this helps prevent massive migration to America, but the border is “porous—a problem with which successive US administrations will have to deal” (236). By 2050, the largest ethnic group in America’s southern border states will be Hispanic.

Internally, “the rugged terrain still prevents Mexico from developing as it would like” (237). To the south lie Belize and Guatemala, but their terrain also is difficult and unprofitable, and Mexico is too busy trying to develop its industry and oil reserves, while quelling various internal conflicts, to embark on military adventures.

One of Mexico’s biggest problems began elsewhere, in Colombia, where, in the 1990s, the US launched a campaign against drug cartels, “closing down many of the air and sea drug routes” (238). The cartels responded by moving contraband north through Central America and Mexico and smuggling it across the US border. Drug-gang turf wars sprung up, “with the winners using their new power and money to infiltrate and corrupt the Mexican police and military and get inside the political and business elites” (238). According to Marshall, “Mexico is now in the grip of what is almost a civil war” (239).

Panama, in Central America, is so thin that a canal is built across it in 1914 to connect Atlantic and Pacific trade, shaving 8,000 miles off the sea journey. China wants Venezuelan oil, but Venezuela and the US are at loggerheads, and Venezuela has cut ties with Panama, an American ally. China therefore has partnered with Nicaragua to build a canal across that nation, hoping this will ensure access to South American resources.

Elsewhere, “China is lending huge sums of money to Latin American governments” (243), hoping they’ll support China at the UN and elsewhere. China also offers them an alternative to America as a trading partner. The US has “used force in Latin America almost fifty times between 1890 and the end of the Cold War” (244). This rankles the locals, who welcome the Chinese opportunity.

Brazil, the largest country by far in South America, with “an area bigger than the twenty-eight EU countries combined” (245), also struggles to prosper because of its geography. One-third of its area is Amazon rainforest, with soils that support jungle but little else; to the south lie the Brazilian Shield highlands, which contain productive agricultural land but poor interconnections. The coastal cities are walled off by mountains. Moreover, “Brazil’s seven largest ports combined can handle fewer goods per year than the single American port of New Orleans” (247). A quarter of Brazil’s population lives in poverty-stricken slums.

According to Marshall, “Brazil is working on its transport infrastructure, and the newly discovered offshore gas reserves” (247), but this will take time. The country wants to establish an EU-like common market with its neighbors, but, again, the difficult South American terrain stymies interconnection. Brazil’s foreign policy is nonconfrontational, so there are few border disputes.

Argentina has some of the best geography in Latin America for development, with large agricultural plains and rivers that flow toward the main port of Buenos Aires. Though economic and political instability have stifled Argentina’s growth, shale oil and gas could provide it with energy “for the next 150 years with excess to export” (250).

At the top of the world, the Arctic ice cap is melting, probably due to human-caused global warming. This has opened the Arctic Ocean to exploitation of its resources. Russia is well ahead in the race for Arctic riches.

Explorers long dreamed of finding a short route from the Atlantic through the Arctic to the Pacific; many died trying until “the great Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen charted his way across” (258) the fabled Northwest Passage above Canada and Alaska in 1905. Today, as the ice recedes, ships during summer ply that route or a northeastern lane off the Russian coast.

Experts believe that “vast quantities of undiscovered natural gas and oil reserves may be in the Arctic region,” along with “extra reserves of the gold, zinc, nickel, and iron already found in part of the Arctic” (262). Several countries border the Arctic—Russia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Greenland, and the US in Alaska, all of whom make up the Arctic Council—but many of their claims to the region are disputed by other Council members. More distant countries argue that the region is part of the international commons and open to all.

Most Arctic Council nations have beefed up their armed forces in the area. Russia engages in massive arctic war games, and it possesses the world’s largest icebreaker fleet, with 32 ships. The US, on the other hand, has only one icebreaker, and it no longer maintains a military presence on Iceland, the first line of defense should Russia send its arctic fleet south into the Atlantic during a crisis.

The US also has not ratified the UNCLOS treaty, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, “effectively ceding two hundred thousand square miles of undersea territory in the Arctic” (268) that it otherwise could claim as an Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ).

The greatest threats, however, come from the Arctic itself: “dark, dangerous, and deadly” (270). International law and dispute resolution are well settled, and the “Arctic Council is composed of mature countries” (269). It may be better to reach reasonable agreements quickly on the territorial issues, so all can work together, protecting each other in the harsh polar environment.

Overcoming the limitations of geography is an age-old dream, but many challenges remain. Russia still fears invasion across its plains. India and China, separated by the Himalayas, may take to the seas to fight. Flooding from global warming, along with desertification elsewhere, will likely increase, causing wars and mass migrations, while battles may break out over scarce fresh-water resources.

A new frontier, space, presents its own physical challenges: “in space, too, we will plant our flags, ‘conquer’ territory, claim ground, and overcome the barriers the universe puts in our way” (276). We can work together beyond the Earth, but according to Marshall, “we are still imprisoned in our own minds, confined by our suspicion of the ‘other’ […] There is a long way to go” (277).