Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942–1943

“The idea of Rassenkampf, or ‘race war’, gave the Russian campaign its unprecedented character. Many historians now argue that Nazi propaganda had so effectively dehumanized the Soviet enemy in the eyes of the Wehrmacht that it was morally anaesthetized from the start of the invasion.”

Here Beevor provides part of the explanation for the brutal warfare on the Eastern Front. Nazi ideology held that the annihilation or subjugation of the Russians was the only possible end to the war, considerably increasing the level of violence thought to be acceptable.

“During this hysteria of deflected blame, the groundwork for organization began.”

Beevor’s analysis of Operation Barbarossa lays the groundwork for the Russian victories at Stalingrad. The reform of the Red Army is depicted as a slow process, in which talented generals like Zhukov took lessons learned early in the war and applied them to future military doctrine. Beevor shows how the complex factors of war and politics can lead to opportunity out of defeat.

“Hitler’s fundamental irresponsibility—a psychologically interesting defiance of fate—had been to launch the most ambitious invasion in history while refusing to gear the German economy and industry for all-out war.”

Hitler’s insistence on not putting the economy on a total war footing meant that the German military was put at an industrial disadvantage compared to the Soviet Union. The Russians quickly created factory cities out of the reach of German arms that could mass-produce armaments. By emphasizing this, Beevor notes the flaws of warfare under dictators.

“We can now see, with the benefit of hindsight, that the balance of power- geopolitical, industrial, economic and demographic- swung decisively against the Axis in December 1941, with the Wehrmacht’s failure to capture Moscow and the American entry into the war. The psychological turning point of the war, however, would come only in the following winter with the battle for the city of Stalingrad.”

Beevor dates the turning point of the war to considerably sooner than was conventional in 1998. It is possible to challenge his view that the industrial power of Russia, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom combined doomed the Nazi war effort and the “psychological turning point” of a war is hard to quantify. Despite this, Beevor shows the immense scope of the Stalingrad campaign, supporting his claim throughout the book.

“The terrible truth, which very few officers could bear to recognize, was that the army’s tolerance or support for the Nazi doctrine of a ‘race war’ on the Eastern Front, exempt from normal military and international law, was bound to turn it into a semi-criminal organization. The failure of generals to protest demonstrated a total lack of moral sensibility, or of moral courage.”

In this quote, Beevor stresses the moral culpability of the Wehrmacht in the genocides of Nazi Germany. The idea of the “clean Wehrmacht,” which was unaware of the war crimes that were enacted by SS and Gestapo forces, has spread since the war. Here, Beevor emphasizes the German army was culpable and chose to participate. This forms part of Beevor’s wider evaluation of the morality of war.

“Hitler, intoxicated with the notion of his own infallibility, and profiting from almost instant communications with their headquarters, would try, godlike, to control every maneuver from afar.”

Hitler’s ability to have direct control over his generals is an issue with the German war effort that Beevor repeatedly brings up. Hitler’s belief in his own military strategy and insistence on its implementation meant poorly thought-out plans were frequently implemented. As Beevor argues in this section, this was made especially dangerous with a general like Paulus, who exercised little autonomy.

“Hitler was so desperate to speed the attack into the Caucus, that he decided to run the two stages concurrently. This, of course, greatly reduced the concentration of force.”

The decision to split the forces of Case Blue into concurrent attacks instead of subsequent ones slowed down the campaigns. While counterfactual hypotheses are problematic, it is possible that, had the forces not been split, the siege of Stalingrad could have been completed faster and the subsequent encirclement avoided.

“Panic-mongers and cowards must be destroyed on the spot. The retreat mentality must be decisively eliminated. Army commanders who have allowed the voluntary abandonment of positions must be removed and sent for immediate trial by military tribunal.”

Beevor writes out some of the text or Order 227, or the “Not One Step Backward” order, to show the reader the mentality with which the Soviets approached morale. The belief that retreat was a sign of disloyalty or cowardice resulted in the mass murders of Russian soldiers by their own officers or NKVD detachments. By quoting the actual wording of the order, Beevor emphasizes the inhumanity of Soviet military discipline.

“The German violation of the Motherland could only be wiped out with bloody revenge.”

Beevor lays out how Soviet propaganda used emotional appeals—often with connotations of sexual violation—to induce soldiers’ bravery. This strand of propaganda is noted to have led to exceptional reciprocal violence, including the mass rape of German civilians by Russian occupying forces later in the war. Beevor highlights how the war was framed by each side is central to understanding the nature of its violence.

“We will defend the city or die in the attempt.”

This quote is Chuikov’s response when asked if he understood his purpose in Stalingrad. This motivation extended throughout much of the rest of Chuikov’s actions and allowed him to entrap the Sixth Army in Stalingrad. It also led to the NKVD purges of his soldiers as this was preferred to defeat.

“Chuikov’s plan was to funnel and fragment German mass assaults with ‘breakwaters.’ Strengthened buildings, manned by infantry with anti-tank rifles and machine guns, would deflect the attacks into channels where camouflage T-34 tanks and anti-tank guns waited, half-buried in the rubble behind.”

As this quote shows, Chuikov and the Russian army were more prepared for the urban fighting around Stalingrad than the Germans were. Having lost the Blitzkrieg advantages of massed armor formations and aerial assaults, the Germans struggled to make progress against entrenched defenders who used the city well. Tactics like this allowed Stalingrad to be held until Operation Uranus.

“All one can be certain about from studies of comparable situations is that the rate of battle-shock casualties must have started to rise sharply in September as soon as the war of movement turned into a war of virtually stationary annihilation.”

In this quote, Beevor demonstrates some of the difficulties faced in studying the psychological impacts of Stalingrad. The Nazis’ refusal to acknowledge the mental toll on their soldiers means there are fewer records to be examined. This is an example of how Beevor makes open reference to his methodology and its limitations.

“‘We Russians were ideologically prepared for the battle of Stalingrad,’ said a veteran officer. ‘Above all, we had no illusions about the cost, and were prepared to pay it.’”

Beevor quotes a veteran of Stalingrad to show the ideological aspect of the war for the Russians. This is an example of Beevor’s use of direct, first-hand testimony as a source for his research. Quoting veterans directly supports the book’s emphasis on real experience and encourages the reader to connect personally with the events of the battle.

“I can’t distinguish where you end, and where the Motherland begins. You and it are the same for me.”

The mental connection made by the Russian soldiers between their family and the country at large is shown by Beevor to be an important factor in their tenacity. While German soldiers doubted the reason for their fight, Soviet propaganda, genuine patriotism, and the fear of German barbarism proved excellent personal motivators.

“Stalin’s great advantage over Hitler was his lack of ideological shame.”

This wording shows how Beevor is able to compare and contrast Stalin and Hitler to assess their relative strengths without appearing to approve of either. He shows that Stalin’s willingness to revive disgraced military traditions in the face of extensive previous failure allowed for the talents of generals like Zhukov to shine through. Hitler was unable to capitulate.

“Paulus has often been blamed for not disobeying Hitler late, once the scale of the disaster was clear, but his real failure as a commander was his failure to prepare to face the threat.”

Central to Beevor’s analysis of Operation Uranus is his belief that a rapid German response to the initial attacks could have prevented it, but that, once encircled, the Sixth Army would have struggled to break out even if they had been ordered to. This quote exemplifies Beevor’s views, as he places the failure of Paulus to an earlier date than other analyses would.

“Goering, with breathtaking irresponsibility, promptly assured Hitler that the Luftwaffe could maintain the Sixth Army in its present position by air.”

Goering’s decision to tell Hitler that the Sixth Army could be supplied by air even when he knew that experts doubted this shows more than an indictment of either man. Rather, the need Goering felt to sycophantically assure Hitler of his own branches of power, and Hitler’s willingness to accept his opinion because of Goering’s loyalty, shows how dictatorial systems lead to incorrect military decisions.

“Christmas was coming. No formation in the Wehrmacht was more preoccupied with the subject than the beleaguered Sixth Army.”

Beevor’s exploration of the curious focus on Christmas within the Kessel shows the complexity of psychology within military units. The hopeless situation that the Sixth Army found themselves in prompted a devotion to happier ideas and events that reminded them of their life at home.

“The hunger pains of German soldiers in the Kessel were indeed bad, but others suffered far more. The 3,500 Russian prisoners of war in the camps at Voroponovo and Gumrak were dying at a rapidly accelerating rate.”

The suffering of Soviet prisoners and civilians within the Kessel is an important aspect that could be overlooked by a focus on the military deterioration of the Sixth Army. German soldiers continued to view the Russians as subhuman, and therefore not deserving of humane treatment.

“Surrender out of the question. Troops fight on to the end. If possible, hold reduced Fortress with troops still battleworthy. Bravery and tenacity of Fortress have provided the opportunity to establish a new front and launch counter-attacks. Sixth Army has thus fulfilled its historical contribution in the greatest passage in German history.”

Hitler’s communique to the Kessel in its final days is worth quoting in its whole. It shows his outright unwillingness to accept the need for surrender and his cynical use of the Sixth Army as a way to fix Russian armies in position while a new front was established. Hitler’s praise of his soldiers was balanced by a willingness to spend their lives when time was necessary.

“Hitler kept coming back again and again to Paulus’s failure to commit suicide. Clearly, it had entirely sullied the myth of Stalingrad in his imagination.”

This quote is demonstrative of the story-making that each side tried to construct about the battle. Hitler wanted to turn it into a heroic last stand in which Germans showed they preferred bravery over death, while the Soviets wanted it to show the tenacity of a united nation. In both cases, the reality was different than the myth.

“The history of the war was suddenly refashioned. The disasters of 1941 were made to appear as if they were all part of a cunning plan devised by Stalin.”

This reformation of historical fact shows an aspect of dictators in war: the chronic inability to accept blame. If a dictator admits to making a mistake it undermines their claim to be needed for rule. Because of that, history must be rewritten by propaganda to show the dictator in the best possible light.

“Thousands, however, were taken on what can only be described as death marches.”

Among the final atrocities of a campaign filled with them, the brutality shown to the German prisoners is demonstrative of the fact that military victory did not end the war or the hatred it aroused. The Soviets still felt justified in killing or mistreating Germans, who had done the same to their compatriots. Throughout the rest of the war, the number of war crimes would not abet as Russia ground down Germany.