Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942–1943

When Hitler was informed of Operation Uranus, his first reaction was to find a scapegoat. After arresting the general of a Panzer Corps stationed near the Kessel, Hitler recognized that the German position in Southern Russia was in danger. He ordered General von Manstein to form the Army Group Don and to assist Paulus’s forces. Paulus, having received Hitler’s order to hold his positions, flew to meet with Hitler and other generals. When Paulus raised the question of retreat, Hitler accused him of cowardice. Hitler claimed the Sixth Army would receive the supplies they needed by air, although this was known to be impossible. Sixth Army generals met shortly after and realized they did not have the supplies to attempt a breakout without being resupplied by the Luftwaffe. Beevor claims that Paulus had the instincts of a staff officer and not a battle general—meaning, he did not know combat well enough to know speed was necessary for his response.

On November 22, Hitler met with Hermann Goering, the head of the Luftwaffe, to discuss aerial resupply. Analysts within the Luftwaffe had concluded that they could only supply short-term aid, and not enough for the whole army, but Goering assured Hitler that “Fortress Stalingrad” could be supplied by air. Hitler’s insistence on staying at Stalingrad was reinforced by his belief that if the Third Reich retreated from the Volga, it would never reach again. The Nazi Party set about suppressing news of the encirclement in the hopes it would soon be rectified.

Within the Kessel, many officers felt it was Paulus’s duty to ignore Hitler’s orders and attempt a breakout. Paulus, however, sternly rejected any idea of deviating from Hitler’s wishes. Much of the non-officer components of the army agreed with Paulus’s decision, fearing a long march in the snow and hoping for relief.

In the first week of December, the Russians attempted to split the Kessel in two, launching a large attack at its center. Half of the remaining panzers were destroyed in holding off this attack, but the Soviets were repulsed. The Kessel still had roughly 290,000 men, many of whom were capable combatants. The NKVD set themselves to evaluate the morale of the Germans who were surrounded, hoping that disheartenment would lead to surrender. However, the Sixth Army’s morale remained relatively solid in this period. Most soldiers continued to believe they would be resupplied and rescued, placing Christmas as the latest date this would happen. Soldiers tried to make their “trench-homes” more welcoming by hanging pictures of their family and combated the cold by using Soviet uniforms or animal skins, though their “homes” were plagued by sickness and lice. Those responsible for administering the air resupply were less optimistic. To properly supply the trapped forces, 300 flights were needed a day. This was far outside of the Luftwaffe’s ability, even before Russian forces began targeting nearby German airfields, and without considering the constraints of weather.

The Soviets were better supplied but still suffered from frostbite in the harsh winter. Some still deserted to the German army as they had not been told—or did not believe—the Germans were encircled. However, the life of the ordinary Russian soldier at Stalingrad had become better. Victory had earned them some improved treatment and respect.

By the end of the first week of December, the snow had become incredibly heavy, fuel shortages reached new heights, and horses were increasingly malnourished. The supply flights did not manage to meet the minimum requirements of supplies, but even still, Goering could not be convinced that they were not up to the task.

While the Sixth Army was suffering from their shortages, Stalin was urging a decisive blow. Operation Saturn was created to attack the Italian Eighth Army and push west from the Kessel toward the city of Rostov, trapping Army Group Don and the German armies in the Caucuses. This was meant to begin on December 10th, but Manstein’s relief attempt needed to be stopped first. Zhukov and Vasilevsky thus created Operation Little Saturn, an assault on the rear and left flank of Army Group Don to stop the relief of Stalingrad.

Simultaneously, Manstein was developing the plan of Operation Winter Storm, an attack on the southern edge of the Russian encirclement to create a corridor through which Stalingrad could be resupplied and reinforced. Manstein also ordered plans to be created for an evacuation of the Sixth Army in the hopes that Hitler consented. On December 12, this attack began. Manstein’s forces were able to advance 30 miles within the first 24 hours, prompting Stalin to reinforce the area. However, the progress was soon made pointless as Stalin agreed to Operation Little Saturn. Soviet forces were able to overrun the airfield through which supplies were sent to Stalingrad and threatened to cut off Manstein’s attack unless he withdrew. Had Paulus attacked at the same time as Manstein, it is possible the Sixth Army could have been saved, but Hitler refused to consider this, and Beevor notes fuel shortages would have made this difficult.

On December 16, the Volga fully froze, meaning trucks could be driven over the river and used to supply the 62nd Army. For the Germans, this cold led to considerable suffering, with frostbite and deaths from exposure or starvation becoming more common. A collapse of health across the Kessel developed because of the effects of continual hunger, prolonged combat, and the weather. The Germans in the Kessel began to fixate on food and fantasize about revenge on the Russians that were surrounding them. Most continued to believe the Nazi propaganda that promised relief.

Beevor then discusses if the Germans could have managed a breakout attempt. He acknowledges the difficulty of this given fuel shortages but emphasizes that because of Hitler, it was never a possibility. His refusal to consider retreat was immovable throughout the battle. Beevor also argues that Manstein likely gave up on the idea, realizing that soldiers from the Caucuses would be far more useful than saving the exhausted men of Stalingrad.

Within the Kessel, a near-obsessive devotion toward the idea of Christmas developed. Soldiers began to save the little food they had for Christmas meals and carved small wooden trees. Army units acted as surrogate families, finding a sense of home with each other. On the back of a Russian map, one soldier named Kurt Rueber drew a picture of the Virgin Mary, which had since become known as Fortress Madonna and is still in Berlin. Despite the Christmas cheer, German letters expressed the desire of most to return home. Areas in the Kessel that still had radio contact with Germany learned that Nazi propaganda claimed to be playing Christmas carols sung by the Germans in Stalingrad, inducing feelings of betrayal. Their seasonal kindness to each other was not extended to prisoners; Germans continued to give the Russian prisoners only rotten corn and no Christmas truce was held.

By Christmas Day, it had been 49 hours without supply flights. When one finally arrived the next day, it was found to be carrying candy for Christmas, but not fuel. On December 28, the Panzer General Hans-Valentin Hube flew out of the Kessel to receive a medal. He was given documents to show the fuel shortages, hoping to prompt Hitler to more action, but Hitler was convinced he was doing everything possible—promising reinforcements from Manstein that would not come.

In the city of Stalingrad, the Germans were on the defensive. They had to conserve ammunition while being attacked and shelter in cellars or bunkers constantly because of Soviet attacks. When New Year came, the Soviets were able to celebrate it with large meals, and while the Germans could not do the same, there was still a nearly obsessive optimism among many. Other soldiers, especially Romanian troops, began to desert in large numbers.

By early 1943, the number of soldiers within the Kessel was reduced to 150,000, of which only a fifth were fit for duty. Russians began probing attacks, hoping to pierce German lines in a time at which they would have trouble digging new trenches due to the frozen ground. Stalin ordered his generals to produce a plan for the final destruction of the Germans, which became known as Operation Ring. General Konstantin Rokossovsky was placed in charge of this operation, which Stalin reluctantly agreed to delay until January 10. On January 8, the Soviets gave the Germans an ultimatum to surrender or be wiped out, but their demand was refused.