The American Crisis

Paine continues to use religious undertones and imagery to make moral judgements and arguments. The author attacks General Howe by questioning his moral character and warning that his reputation, legacy, and afterlife in heaven are in jeopardy because of his actions in the war. Paine sarcastically muses about how General Howe should be buried, asking him, “How, sir, shall we dispose of you?” (59). Paine accuses Howe of having already left the “moral world” and wishes Howe’s death will come soon since his reputation is already dead. Paine uses dramatic imagery reminiscent of the Christian scriptures to depict Howe as a snake with the “venomous malignity of a serpent and the spiteful imbecility of an inferior reptile” (61), which recalls the serpent whose betrayal ousted Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden, condemning them to a mortal life of sin.

Paine warns that once dead, Howe’s actions will be judged by God and the approval of the king, bishops, chaplains, or parliament will not comfort him or save him from punishment. He harshly chastises Howe’s character and conduct, accusing him of being fraudulent, cruel, and mean. He claims that Howe has committed the worst sin of “willful and offensive war,” unlike America which has taken up the sword of “virtuous defence” (70). He similarly chastises the Earl of Carlisle and General Clinton, asking them if they are men or devils and accusing Britain of being faithless. Paine states his belief that “Providence” is on America’s side and argues that God must have some “nobler end to accomplish” through America aside from enriching Britain (70).

Paine also develops his analysis of military strategy by dissecting Howe’s recent military campaign. Paine uses military reasoning to plant seeds of doubt in Howe’s mind about the efficacy of his decisions, mocking his lack of war strategy and comparing his army’s movements around America to “a puppy pursuing his tail” (65). He reminds Howe of the colonist army’s dominance in the north and their successes in recapturing Ticonderoga and Independence Forts and boasts of the Americans’ 11,000 British prisoners and valuable supplies the Americans seized.

Paine downplays Howe’s occupation of Philadelphia by calling it “mere shelter” that will not contribute to a British victory. He characterizes the occupation as “unmilitary and passive,” and accuses Howe of “hiding among women and children” (66). He does not admit that losing Philadelphia to Britain was a real loss, instead claiming that it’s actually advantageous. He accuses General Howe of entering his “winter quarters” in October in order to avoid defeat, and teases Howe by framing the Philadelphia occupation as a dilemma: leave the city and risk defeat or stay and risk starvation. He posits that “every military power in Europe will conclude you to be eventually defeated” (66), and confidently predicts American success in the war.

Paine also uses his strategic insight to offer advice to the American forces. He assures Americans that their victory is near and the enemy’s army is insignificant. While Paine praises the attitudes and actions of Pennsylvanians in the face of the British occupation, he admits that they need more soldiers to defeat the British. He also predicts that the British will utilize misinformation to confuse and delay the colonist forces coming to aid people in Pennsylvania.

Paine asserts to his fellow Americans that the most efficient and peaceful way to win the war would be to gather an army indisputably superior to Britain’s in order to force a British surrender. As such, he recommends conscripting men across the colonies to join the war effort, a suggestion which reveals that the colonists’ forces did not have enough volunteers at this time in the war. Paine acknowledges that, as the war reaches its third year, Americans are tiring of the conflict and less eager to participate in combat, but Paine wants to “revive something of that virtuous ambition which first called America out into the field” (77).

Further, he suggests that those too aged or infirm to serve should be legally obliged to contribute clothing or money to the cause. He notes that it’s both easier and cheaper than spending time and money recruiting men to the cause. Wary of a potential backlash to these ideas, Paine says it is just “a hint capable of much improvement” which he wanted to suggest to the public (78-79).

When addressing the Earl and General Clinton, Paine’s strategies shift focus from the American theatre of war to the British Isles. He compares the largely agrarian American economy with Britain’s populated towns and cities in order to claim that Britain is more vulnerable to “incendiary desolation” than America (81-82). Paine boldly threatens that American revolutionaries could easily travel to Britain to burn down the ships in the Thames and The East India House and the Bank, attacks which Paine claims could bankrupt Britain (83). He tries to intimidate the Earl and General by warning that Britain’s geographical distance does not make it secure from American aggression and describes the relative ease with which an American could carry out such attacks.