43 pages • 1 hour read
Jonathan HaidtA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
“Shweder offered a simple idea to explain why the self differs so much across cultures: all societies must resolve a small set of questions about how to order society, the most important being how to balance the needs of individuals and groups.”
The author uses the insights of Richard Shweder, a psychological anthropologist, to understand morality and politics in current societies. According to Shweder, society has only two options, which stem directly from The Tension Between Social Cohesion and Individual Freedom. Societies can be sociocentric and emphasize the needs of the group, or they can be individualistic and emphasize the needs of the individual. Most of the world’s societies are sociocentric in orientation, though the Western world is not.
“When you put individuals first, before society, then any rule or social practice can be questioned. If it doesn’t protect someone from harm, then it can’t be morally justified. It’s just social convention.”
Haidt explains why the reactions to theoretical anecdotes varied so widely between Indians and Americans. Americans see any situation that causes harm to an individual as wrong, whereas their Indian counterparts condemn actions that compromise the strength of the society and societal rules.
“They seemed to be morally dumbfounded—rendered speechless by their inability to explain verbally what they knew intuitively.”
In his research, Haidt found that sometimes participants would be disgusted by a situation in which no harm had been done to any person (or animal). These participants would feel the need to invent a victim in order to articulate a reason to condemn the behavior. This illustrates The Primacy of Intuition and Emotion in Moral Judgment.
“[I]t’s obvious that people were making moral judgment immediately and emotionally. Reasoning was merely the servant of the passions and when the servant failed to find any good arguments, the master did not change his mind.”
Central to the book is the idea that the individual makes instant and emotional decisions about moral situations. After making these instant judgments, individuals look to reason to explain the judgments. Even when they cannot explain them, they still don’t waiver.
“We do moral reasoning not to reconstruct the actual reasons why we ourselves came to a judgment; we reason to find the best possible reason why somebody else ought to join us in our judgment.”
Haidt argues that our moral judgments are made quickly, and, afterward, we find rational support for them. We do not seek this rationale to defend ourselves, however, because we feel validated simply by our emotional reaction. We seek reason because we want to be able to convince others of our view.
“The mind is divided into two parts, like a rider (controlled processes) on an elephant (automatic processes). The rider evolved to serve the elephant.”
A central metaphor of the book is the rider-elephant relationship. Haidt presents the mind in two parts. The elephant represents the instinctual, immediate part of the brain that is ruled by emotion and evolutionary knowledge. The rider is the rational part of the mind that can offer complex, reason-based explanations. The elephant is in charge, and the rider exists to serve the elephant, to steer and accompany.
“[I]f you want to change someone’s mind about a moral or political issue, talk to the elephant first. If you ask people to believe something that violates their intuitions, they will devote their efforts to finding an escape hatch—a reason to doubt your argument or conclusion.”
Understanding that we are guided by the elephant, by emotion and not reason, can help us have more civil debates. We need to be aware of what emotional and instinctual motives others hold in order to engage them in ways that will connect with their intuitive knowledge.
“The main way we change our minds on moral issues is by interacting with other people. We are terrible at seeking evidence that challenges our own beliefs but other people do us this favor.”
Because decisions are made based on emotion, our emotional reactions toward others guide our findings. We naturally lean away from those we have a strong negative reaction to, but if we feel affection, admiration, or a desire to please, we are more likely to open our minds and reconsider our judgments.
“We’re really good at holding others accountable for their actions and we’re really skilled at navigating through a world in which others hold us accountable for our own.”
While we may like to think that we make virtuous choices because we want to do the right thing, really we are more motivated by wanting to look like we are doing the right thing. Reputation is what motivates us most strongly, keeping individual actions in check with the fear of harsh appraisal from the group.
“People are trying harder to look right than to be right.”
Haidt contrasts the commonplace engagement of “confirmatory thought,” in which individuals seek out information that confirms their belief with the far-less-frequently used “exploratory thought,” in which individuals even-handedly consider opposite views. Because they want to seem correct, individuals look for information to bolster their case.
“With the help of the press secretary, we are able to lie and cheat often and then cover it up so effectively we convince even ourselves.”
The press secretary of the mind functions as a sort of conscience, but not a genuine one that honestly weighs information. Instead, the press secretary works hard to rationalize and explain behavior and decisions. The press secretary cannot override the decisions of the elephant. The press secretary can only offer a plausible story.
“The WEIRDer you are, the more you see a world full of separate objects, rather than relationships.”
This is one of several examples of The Cultural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Being Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) increases the likelihood of a person focusing on objects and individuals and sorting out their place in a larger category in a detached and rational way. This WEIRD approach contrasts with the non-WEIRD demographic, where relationships and the larger whole are paramount.
“I liked these people…My elephant leaned towards them, which made my rider search for moral arguments in their defense.”
Haidt’s experience in India is a challenging and ultimately formative one. Some aspects of the moral code, specifically the treatment of women, servants, and the environment, trouble him. But because he cares for the people there (a reaction of the elephant part of his brain), he finds the rational part of his mind (the rider) looking for ways to understand their worldview.
“It felt good to be released from partisan anger…I was able to explore new moral matrices, each one supported by its own intellectual tradition. It felt like a kind of awakening.”
Haidt’s experience in India, in which he is able to examine moral situations via the lens of different moral matrices, gives him a valuable framework through which to view political differences in the United States. He is able to see beyond “we are right, they are wrong” and better understand the moral underpinning of different judgments.
“Moral matrices bind people together and blind them to the coherence, or even existence, of other matrices.”
Growing up in a particular environment, whether WEIRD or non-WEIRD, determines how a person views moral situations. It can also make it impossible to see the moral compulsions of others and what other cultures hold sacred in terms of moral values.
“The righteous mind is like a tongue with six receptors…morality is like a cuisine: it’s a cultural construction, influenced by accidents of environment and history but it’s not so flexible that anything goes.”
Haidt suggests that there are six main receptors, or taste buds, that help us sort out moral situations in culturally viable ways. These six taste buds are Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, Sanctity, and Justice. Our palates vary in terms of what receptors we use most often. Conservatives tend to engage all six receptors whereas liberals primarily engage two (Care and Fairness).
“[T]he two ends of the political spectrum rely upon each foundation in different ways, or to different degrees.”
After making a case for each of these foundational taste buds of the moral mind, Haidt demonstrates that they take different shapes for different political groups. Authority may be a force to rail against or to support, depending on one’s response to this taste bud. Some taste buds are readily activated in certain cultures, religious groups, or environments, but all are capable of being activated in an individual’s moral mind.
“Within the first half second after hearing a statement, partisan brains are already reacting differently. These initial flashes of neural activity are the elephant, leaning slightly, which then causes their riders to reason differently, search for different kinds of evidence, and reach different conclusions. Intuitions come first, reasoning second.”
In an experiment with a social neuroscientist, Haidt has liberal and conservative students read sentences with two different versions, each consistent with a political party’s foundation (i.e., “total equality in the workplace is necessary” and “total equality in the workplace is unrealistic”). Haidt discovers via EKG results that both student groups have measurable and immediate reactions to sentences that agree with their moral viewpoints.
“Republicans understand the social intuitionist model better than do Democrats. Republicans speak more directly to the elephant. They also have a better grasp of Moral Foundations Theory; they trigger every single taste receptor.”
Using modern politicians as an example, Haidt illustrates how conservative leaders activate more taste buds, or moral receptors, than liberals. Haidt attributes this partly to the conservative view that the basic social unit is the family while liberals extol a more individualistic view.
“Natural selection works at multiple levels simultaneously, sometimes including groups of organisms.”
Haidt makes a case for group selection, an idea that was overturned in the scientific community decades ago in favor of the less complicated hypothesis that humans are selfishly motivated and that the individual pursuit of survival is hardwired into our genes. Haidt argues that selfishness does help survival for individuals but that individuals are also helped by membership in a group. This group membership can prompt individuals to be parochially generous, meaning that they sacrifice willingly but only for their own group.
“We have the ability (under special circumstances) to transcend self-interest and lose ourselves (temporarily and ecstatically) in something larger than ourselves. That ability is what I’m calling the hive switch.”
Haidt examines the ways in which individuals transcend ordinary existence in order to experience something sacred, on a higher plane. Time in nature, drug experimentation, and participation in raves are modern-day experiences that can prompt this hive switch. Military exercises or religious ceremonies can activate this as well.
“To make a human hive, you want to make everyone feel like a family. So don’t call attention to racial and ethnic differences; make them less relevant by ramping up similarity and celebrating the group’s shared values and common goals.”
Though liberals routinely celebrate cultural difference and feel that this makes members of a community feel more wanted and respected, Haidt argues that this practice, in fact, undermines the unity of the group. The hive would be better protected by stressing goals and ideas that all members share.
“We humans have an extraordinary ability to care about things beyond ourselves, to circle around those things with other people, and in the process bind ourselves to teams that can pursue larger projects. That’s what religion is about. And with a few adjustments, that’s what politics is all about.”
Organized religion is less about good versus evil and supernatural agents and more about hive switch. Morality offers individuals a shared framework through which to view the world, one that responds to the various foundational receptors in assorted ways. Religion both binds and blinds—it creates community but also makes that community unable to see the potential validity of other moral matrices. Haidt argues religion shares this tendency with politics.
“Moral communities are fragile things, hard to build and easy to destroy. When we think about very large communities such as nations, the challenge is extraordinary and the threat of moral entropy is intense.”
Successful moral groups, including political parties, can be difficult to keep focused and cohesive. Haidt believes that liberals often sabotage their own attempts to create focused, cohesive groups through their moral foundations of Authority (opposed to overly consolidated power) and Fairness (being permissive about self-expression and individualism at the expense of the group).
“Morality binds and blinds. It binds us into ideological teams that fight each other as though the fate of the world depended on our side winning each battle. It blinds us to the fact that each team is composed of good people who have something important to say.”
Haidt concludes by reiterating all that is gained by moral groups, be they religious or political. The hive switch that is created by membership in a group that shares foundational values allows us to access a sense of shared purpose and to be orientated strongly toward the success of our group. It can also render us unaware of the possible validity of other moral matrices and of truth that might be accessible if viewed via other lenses.
By Jonathan Haidt