The Soul of an Octopus: A Surprising Exploration into the Wonder of Consciousness

The overriding theme of the book is whether animals have consciousness and a soul, just as humans do. Montgomery explores this throughout the book, as she observes the behavior of octopuses when interacting with her and her friends, and examines empirical research about them. She takes her cue from Thomas Nagel’s famous 1974 essay entitled “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” and tries to learn what it is like to be an octopus. Some of the questions she attempts to answer are the following: Do octopuses have a sense of self? If so, how do they perceive it? Do they have a sense of other beings? Do they have a soul?

Montgomery provides ample evidence that octopuses recognize and have varying attitudes toward different people. They respond to the touch of humans in various ways, able to distinguish them both through sight and “tasting” people’s skin with their suckers. One study Montgomery notes had two people, unknown to the octopuses and dressed identically, exhibit different behavior toward the octopuses: One person fed the octopuses, while the other person brushed the octopuses with a prickly, irritating stick. The animals soon learned the difference, moving toward the feeder and away from the brusher. Sometimes they even squirted the latter with water from their funnel (9-10). Octavia’s behavior at the end of her life also indicated an ability to distinguish between people. She recognized Bill’s touch after nearly a year of no contact, allowing herself to be collected in a net and moved to a new tank. Likewise, she recognized Montgomery and Wilson and came to them simply to interact (see Chapter 8).

Recognizing others is one indication that a creature can differentiate them from itself, thus possessing a sense of self. The question here is just how that might manifest itself in an octopus. Unlike humans, whose neurons are mostly centralized in their brains, octopuses have more neurons distributed throughout their arms than they do in their brains. This leads some to speculate that their sense of self may be divided into multiple selves. If so, the philosopher Peter Godfrey-Smith suggests, they might have a “collaborative, cooperative, but distributed mind” (160). Indeed, Montgomery speculates, it’s possible each arm has its own mind.

A soul, on the other hand, is not something empirical science can prove or disprove; it’s more in the realm of philosophers. Some, like Plato, believed there is a kind of “world soul” to which all living beings are connected. Montgomery doesn’t delve too deeply into arguments for or against the idea that animals have souls, but it’s clear she thinks they do. She describes her visit to a church during her diving expedition to Mooréa, where she contemplates this and concludes that if she has a soul, then an octopus does too.