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52 pages 1 hour read

Robert Heilbroner

The Worldly Philosophers

Nonfiction | Biography | Adult | Published in 1953

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Chapters 9-11Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapter 9 Summary: “The Heresies of John Maynard Keynes”

The philosophies of John Maynard Keynes emerged after the stock market crash of 1929 had left the world economy paralyzed by both mass unemployment and a lack of capital to invest in production. Keynes was no left-wing radical like Marx; he came from a respectable family in England and lived a life marked by achievement and easy success. After completing his Ph.D. and spending two years in the civil service, he took a post at Cambridge, where he found immediate success. He also joined the Bloomsbury Group, made up of the leading artistic and intellectual minds of the day.

During World War I, Keynes was a key figure in the British Treasury. After the war, he railed against the vindictive and unsustainable peace accords like the Treaty of Versailles, which he (correctly) predicted would lead to a resurgence of German militarism. He resigned and wrote a book arguing his point, which made him famous, and he used his intellect and newfound fame to speculate in international markets, quickly amassing a small fortune.

By the 1930s, Keynes turned his attention to the question of what made the economy cycle between prosperity and depression. He returned to a once-maligned argument from Hobson: Excess saving pulled capital from the market system, thus creating an economic crisis. This argument was dismissed in Hobson’s time because those who saved were the same as those who put savings to use: wealthy landlords and capitalists. As time went on, the distribution of wealth improved, and amassing savings became possible for all classes of society. Also, as businesses became larger, they had to look for investment capital not only from owners but also from dispersed individual shareholders. “Hence saving and investing became divorced from one another—they became separate operations carried out by separate groups of people” (264).

Keynes argued that the prosperity of a nation was not measured by gold or physical assets but by the total of all incomes earned. The flow of income ensured prosperity: With every purchase, part of one person’s income was transferred to someone else; likewise, that spender’s income came from money yet another person had spent. Savings did not contribute directly to someone else’s income. Instead, savings funded investments or stayed in the bank, which loaned out savers’ money. Trouble occurred when capitalists, worried about the economic outlook, didn’t reinvest savings. Savings sat idle, which reduced income for all—throughout all this, savers and capitalists acted rationally. Recessions occurred when there were too few investment opportunities to absorb savings, or insufficient savings to support investment.

Because interest was the price of acquiring money, excess savings should have driven the interest rate down, making it cheaper to invest, and thus ending any recession. This natural series of events failed to happen during the Great Depression, leading Keynes to write his magnum opus, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Keynes argued that the economy of the period had lost its automatic righting mechanism because no flood of savings lay at the bottom of the cycle; as incomes had contracted, people had stopped saving. The problem was not a glut of savings but a lack of savings, which left the economy in a long-term state of depression. Recession was an omnipresent threat in capitalism because investment projects eventually came to a halt once the market was satisfied. The economy satisfied not human wants but human demands, and demand was determined by income.

Keynes offered not only a diagnosis for the Great Depression but also a solution: “the deliberate undertaking of government spending to stimulate the economy” (274). Government stimulus had already begun when Keynes wrote his General Theory, but he encouraged even more spending. He proposed not a radical new program, but an intellectual framework for what was already occurring. He predicted that government investment would lead to the resumption of private investment, which would lift the income of unemployed workers.

Although private investment did recover after the stock market crashed, unemployment lingered for two reasons: government did not have the capacity to spend enough to bring the economy to full employment—at least not until World War II—and businesses interpreted government action as threatening. Capitalists resented New Deal legislation, which improved workers’ rights and threatened the bourgeoisie’s preeminent position in the economy. Although his plans were attacked as socialist, Keynes was at heart a conservative who wanted to manage and save capitalism.

Keynes died in 1946, so influential that Keynesian economics completely dominated the field from 1940 to 1960. After 1960, his influence waned; by 1980, “it was hard to find an American economist under the age of 40 who professed to be a Keynesian” (286). Keynes’ macro view of the economy was difficult to reconcile with the dominant micro perspectives that emphasized the centrality of individuals. In a Cold War world, Keynes’ activist view of government also sparked fears of a slide toward socialism or communism. 

Chapter 10 Summary: “The Contradictions of Joseph Schumpeter”

Joseph Schumpeter was born in Austria in 1883, the same year as Keynes. They shared an admiration for capitalism and high-class bourgeois values but had very different views about the future of capitalism. Although Keynes believed that there was always a short-term threat of stagnation, which might require government intervention, capitalism would always lead to long-term growth, ending the problem of scarcity, as Keynes predicted, by 2030. Schumpeter saw capitalism as inherently dynamic; it did not require permanent government support, although government spending could ease social distress in times of depression. He believed that capitalism would produce growth in the short term, but it would not survive in the long term.

Schumpeter attended a school for sons of the aristocracy, where he imitated the tastes and customs of his wealthier schoolmates. A brilliant student, he became an advisor to an Egyptian princess and published his first book on economics, The Theory of Economic Development, in 1912. He argued that the capitalist economy was successful when it was at a steady state, where growth was absent and profit nonexistent: “Profits appeared in a static economy when the circular flow failed to follow its routinized course” (295).

Schumpeter believed profits came not from the exploitation of labor or the growth of capital, but from the introduction of new technological or organizational inventions into this static system. Profits were generated when an innovative capitalist produced the same goods as others, but at a cheaper cost. The person who introduced these innovations was not a normal businessman who follows the given routines, but an entrepreneur, who could come from any social class. The entrepreneur engaged in “creative destruction,” the process by which innovation replaces old technology with new, fundamentally altering society in the process. The profits generated by innovation, however, went not to the entrepreneur but to the capitalist. Eventually, others copied these innovations, eliminating profit and returning the economy to its steady state.

The Theory of Economic Development launched Schumpeter’s professional career. He spent brief periods with the German government, with an Austrian bank, and as an economics professor at Harvard. The Great Depression tested his assumptions: If capitalism derived its energy from the innovations of entrepreneurs, why had this energy stopped? He gave an answer in Business Cycles, published in 1939, arguing that three different business cycles operated in the short, medium, and long terms. In the genesis of the Great Depression, all three cycles hit their lowest point at the same time. At the same time capitalism, which was fueled by faith in the values and virtues of the market system, had lost its mobilizing force.

Schumpeter’s most important work, expanding on his previous insights, was Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, published in 1942. He wrote in part to critique Keynesianism, but his true intellectual foe was Marx. Marx saw the constant struggle between the working class and the bourgeoisie as the impetus for capitalist dynamism, but Schumpeter thought dynamism came not from the capitalist but from the upstart entrepreneur.

Schumpeter and Marx were not always at odds. Like Marx, Schumpeter believed that capitalism could not survive: “Capitalism may be an economic success, but it is not a sociological success” (302). He argued that capitalism bred a rational, critical ideology that brought down precapitalist institutions like the monarchy; the same ideology would eventually turn on itself to bring down bourgeois values. Capitalism would end not because of a working class uprising or a series of worsening crises, but because when the ideological atmosphere changed, the bourgeois class would lose faith in itself, and capitalism would morph into socialism. 

Chapter 11 Summary: “The End of the Worldly Philosophy?”

Since society evolved from tradition and command systems toward free market capitalism, three changes have occurred: a dependency on the accumulation drive as the primary means for organizing society; the creation of a market that determines production of goods and the distribution of wealth; and capitalist societies guided by two authorities, one public and one private, with clearly delineated spheres of activity. Together, these changes formed the market system and accompanying social constructs that the worldly philosophers sought to understand.

Heilbroner notes three reasons why modern economists are driven to see economics as a science. First, those who study the economy want to find regularities they can codify into mathematical laws, like the laws observed in the natural world. Second, they believe economic behavior is easier to predict than other aspects of social decision-making, such as politics. If economics became a true science, economists could both predict and change the course of human events.

Economics, however, cannot be solely envisioned as a science for two reasons. First, human behavior cannot be understood without taking into account volition and free will, which are inherently unpredictable: “If economics were in fact a science, we humans would be mere robots, no more capable of choosing what was to be our response to a price rise than is a particle of iron to presence of a magnet” (318). Second, social life is always inherently political. People occupy categories of privilege, and capitalist societies are no exception. Economics can never claim be fully objective and scientific because the market system is produced by society, not processes outside of human control, like evolution or physics, and policy recommendations can never be neutral.

Economics cannot, and should not, be seen as a science. Its ultimate usefulness lies in understanding capitalism, which will shape human collective destiny for the foreseeable future. Despite basic similarities, capitalisms take on different forms; with regard to these different social aspects, worldly philosophy plays a most important role. This future will bring many strains and stresses: climate change, nuclear weaponry, ethnic hatred, and the growth of a truly supranational globalized economy, which arose within nation-state capitalism but has since escaped its control. The purpose of economics should be “to develop a new awareness of the need for, and the possibilities of, socially as well as economically successful capitalisms” (321). A worldly economic philosophy, Heilbroner believes, can guide nation-state market systems through this challenging future.

Chapters 9-11 Analysis

By the late 1920s, America was “drunk with the elixir of prosperity” (248). As the age of the robber baron passed, Americans saw themselves in a place where poverty would disappear, and where, thanks to the stock market, smart investment could make anyone rich. In October 1929, the stock market crashed, destroying $40 billion in wealth almost overnight and ripping the veil off the notion that all could easily acquire and keep wealth. In retrospect, the crash seems inevitable—wealth inequality was extremely severe, unemployment ran rampant, banks failed continually, and people accumulated heavy debts—but what most destroyed faith in the system was mass unemployment, and how there seemed to be no political or economic solutions for the Great Depression. Economists had little to offer: Prior to 1929, the paradox of insufficient production existing side-by-side with mass unemployment had seemed impossible. The assumed self-righting mechanisms of the free market systems were nonoperational.

Two modern worldly philosophers emerged during the Great Depression: Keynes and Schumpeter. Keynes explained the depression as a lapse in what he called the savings-investment channel. In normal times, people saved by putting money in the bank or by purchasing stocks and bonds, and those savings were reinvested by capitalists to build new productive capacity. Keynes challenged the assumptions that the savings-investment cycle was automatic; neither savings nor investment opportunities were always available. Economic crisis reduced people’s savings and lowered confidence, which kept capitalists from investing in innovation.

Schumpeter, on the other hand, proposed that three economic cycles operated at once: short, medium, and long term. The Great Depression happened when each cycle bottomed out simultaneously. He also argued that the free market depended on faith in capitalism. When neither the public nor private sector had answers for the depression, faith in capitalism plummeted.

Keynes offered a prescription for ending the depression: government stimulus. He viewed government intervention as necessary to restart private investment and return the economy to full employment. Less prescriptive, Schumpeter believed innovation came from entrepreneurs, noncapitalist elites who innovated for the joy of creation rather than to generate profit. These elites were “characterized by supernormal qualities of intellect and will” (307), and history would always be a story about the impact of elites on an inert society.

A capitalist ennui prevailed in the late 1960s, when it seemed that western free markets would move toward planned economies. After the stagflation of the 1970s, unfettered capitalism once again reigned supreme, motivated by resentment of high marginal tax rates, high interest rates, and high fuel prices. Keynes and Schumpeter had different opinions about whether or not the market system could survive and whether or not capitalism could be managed. Keynes argued that capitalism could easily get stuck in a static state in the short term but would survive over the long term, so long as the government always came to the rescue in times of crisis. In contrast, Schumpeter believed capitalism would not survive in the long term because capitalism bred a critical attitude, causing the bourgeoisie to turn on itself and eroding faith in the market system—which, as Schumpeter noted during the depression, was essential to the system’s survival.

Heilbroner concludes the book by reflecting on the state of late 20th- and early 21st-century economics. To Heilbroner, both Keynes and Schumpeter reflect the promise of economics to guide capitalism while also showing the limitations self-imposed in the field’s quest to become a science. Schumpeter’s argument emphasized the limitations of viewing modern economics as a quantifiable social science, in which accurate prediction was always possible. If capitalism collapsed, it would be for sociopolitical and cultural reasons that were as impossible to predict as human nature.

Heilbroner says a new period of economic thought began in the 1980s; unlike preceding economists, modern economists lack consensus on how to perceive the economy, resulting in both a crisis of vision and a lack of clear-cut prescriptions. This crisis has affected the U.S. and U.K. more than Europe, where a pragmatic fusion of free market capitalism with government intervention has already taken hold.

If the field of economics in the 21st century is to match the scope and innovation of the 19th and early 20th centuries, it must incorporate knowledge from other fields of social inquiry and return to the tradition of asking the big questions. The new economics must be deepened and enlarged compared to the state of the field today. Economics cannot guide a country without competent political leadership, but at the same time, leaders must rely on sensible economic theories to maximize societal welfare.

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